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Joseph Scott Millert
The novelty and nonobviousness requirements of patentability
embody a congressional understanding, implicit in the Patent
Clause itself, that free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to
which the protection of a federal patent is the exception.1
I. INTRODUCTION
This essay arises from my participation in an April 2006 conference
at Seattle University Law School. The conference was titled, At the In-
tersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law. Looking Both
Ways to Avoid a Collision. This "intersection" metaphor is a common
one for describing antitrust law's relationship with intellectual property
law, among both commentators 2 and courts. 3 And the metaphor endures
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1. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (striking down a
Florida hull design protection statute because it conflicted with federal patent law by sheltering a
useful design from competition without requiring that the design satisfy patent law's rigorous
threshold requirements (e.g., nonobviousness)). Bonito Boats was a unanimous decision written by
Justice O'Connor. Id. at 143.
2. Consider the titles of the following articles: John Fazzio, Pharmaceutical Patent Settle-
ments: Fault Lines at the Intersection of Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law Require a Return to
the Rule of Reason, II J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1 (2006); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersec-
tion: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (1984); A. Douglas Melamed & Ali M. Stoeppelwerth,
The CSU Case. Facts, Formalism and the Intersection ofAntitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 10
GEO. MASON L. REV. 407 (2002); Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy. Issues at the
Intersection ofAntitrust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913 (2001).
3. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Lit., No. 03-7641, 2006 WL 2401244, *1 (2d
Cir. 2006) ("This appeal, arising out of circumstances surrounding a lawsuit in which a drug manu-
facturer alleged that its patent for the drug tamoxifen citrate ('tamoxifen') was about to be infringed,
and the suit's subsequent settlement, requires us to address issues at the intersection of intellectual
property law and antitrust law."); Telcom Technical Servs., Inc. v. Rolm Co., 388 F.3d 820, 826
(I lth Cir. 2004) ("[T]his question lies at the intersection of intellectual property law and antitrust
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despite the decades-old recognition that the antitrust and intellectual
property laws have the same overall goal-"to maximize wealth by pro-
ducing what consumers want at the lowest cost."'4 Perhaps it endures be-
cause these two regimes pursue their shared goal through quite different
means, one by fostering competition (antitrust) and one by curtailing it
(intellectual property). 5
My goal here is to explore a different metaphor for describing the
relationship between antitrust law and patent law (the branch of intellec-
tual property law with which I am most familiar). To wit: patent ships
sail an antitrust sea, protecting those aboard from free competition's
harshest dangers-but only for a time. No ship lasts forever; the seas
abide.6
It is, of course, fair to ask, why spend more than a moment or two
thinking about which metaphor-intersecting roads or a ship in the sea-
is more apt? It's just a metaphor! The time is well spent, I think, because
metaphors shape how we think about a topic and can also help illuminate
that topic. As Professor Eugene Volokh notes in one of his works explor-
ing the "slippery slope" metaphor in law, "metaphors are falsehoods that
aim at exposing a deeper truth. They can be legitimate, and rhetorically
law ...."); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., 344 F.3d 1294, 1307 (1 1th Cir. 2003) ("This ap-
proach is commonly used by courts considering the intersection of patent law and antitrust law.").
4. WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
APPRAISAL 1 (1973). See also Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (observing that "[tlhe patent and antitrust laws are complementary in purpose in that they each
promote innovation and competition"); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 897 F.2d
1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("[W]hen the patented product is so successful that it creates its own
economic market or consumes a large section of an existing market, the aims and objectives of pat-
ent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, wholly at odds. However, the two bodies of law are
actually complementary, as both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition.").
5. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The conflict between
the antitrust and patent laws arises in the methods they embrace that were designed to achieve recip-
rocal goals. While the antitrust laws proscribe unreasonable restraints of competition, the patent laws
reward the inventor with a temporary monopoly that insulates him from competitive exploitation of
his patented art."). See also BOWMAN, supra note 4, at 2 (explaining that
[p]atent law, thought by some to be an exception to a general rule in favor of competition, shares
with antitrust law its central purpose-efficiently providing those things consumers value. But the
means are different. Patent law pursues this goal by encouraging the invention of new and better
products. Invention, like other forms of productive activity, is not costless .... The exclusive right to
make, use and vend the invention or discovery, which Congress has long granted patentees, is thus a
legal monopoly exempt from the more general proscription of trade restraints and monopolization
under early common law and more recent antitrust statutes.
(internal quotation and footnotes omitted)).
6. 1 am uncertain, but I think I first encountered a version of this metaphor at a presentation
given by Ken Germain of Thompson Hine LLP. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Germain, The Interface and
Conflict Between Utility Patents, Design Patents and Copyrights, on the One Hand, and Trademark!
Trade Dress Rights, on the Other Hand, in ADVANCED SEMINAR ON TRADEMARK LAW 2005 (2005),
available at 834 PLI/Pat 231, 237 (Westlaw) (describing intellectual property protection as "islands
afloat" in "the great sea of free competition").
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powerful. Some of the most effective legal arguments use metaphor., 7
Indeed, as Professor Patricia Loughlan explains in her engaging, exam-
ple-rich meditation on intellectual property metaphors, three metaphor
clusters-"the metaphor of the unauthorised user of intellectual property
as a 'pirate' or 'parasite' or 'poacher,' the metaphor of the author or in-
ventor of an intellectual work as a 'farmer,' and the metaphor of intellec-
tual creations which are not subject to private ownership, as 'a com-
mon -8-powerfully shape our understanding of intellectual property law
and policy.9 I will, in any event, be brief, appreciating that we should not
mistake even the most compelling metaphor for the reality that we are
trying to understand.'0
The deeper truths evoked by patent ships sailing an antitrust sea are
three. First, free competition is the pervasive, baseline reality, the back-
ground norm; patent protection is the temporary, partial exception. Sec-
ond, we grasp both patent and antitrust policy with a common science:
economics. Third, although neither patent nor antitrust law doctrines are
good tools for fixing fundamental problems in the other body of law,
both bodies of law help us better understand the shortcomings of the
other. I explore these ideas in turn, below.
II. FREE COMPETITION IS THE RULE, AND PATENT LAW THE EXCEPTION
When we think of patent law and antitrust law as intersecting roads,
rather than as patent ships in an antitrust sea, we put these two bodies of
law on roughly equal footing. In the "intersections" image, neither sur-
rounds, nor could engulf, the other. That image thus misses a basic fact
about our market economy. Free competition, which antitrust law helps
ensure, is the fundamental norm. Indeed, "[t]he policy of free
7. Eugene Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1155, 1157
(2005).
8. Patricia Loughlan, Pirates, Parasites, Reapers, Sowers, Fruits, Foxes... The Metaphors of
Intellectual Property Law, 28 SYDNEY L. REV. 211, 216 (2006).
9. Id at 217-25.
10. Volokh, supra note 7, at 1157 ("Yet, as Justice Holmes cautions us, we must 'think things
not words' - 'or at least we must constantly translate our words into the facts for which they stand, if
we are to keep to the real and the true."') (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and
Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 460 (1899)). See also Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155
N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as
devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it."); David A. Anderson, Metaphorical
Scholarship, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1205, 1214-15 (1990) (reviewing STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990) and arguing that
[I]ike other forms of discourse, however, metaphor is useful only to the extent that it pro-
duces shared understanding. In legal scholarship, it is a mixed blessing. It is useful be-
cause it is evocative, but it may evoke different ideas in different readers. It liberates the
author from some of the rigidity of exposition, but also from the demands of precision
and clarity.).
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competition runs deep in our law." ' Patent protection, if one can obtain
it at all, is a hard-earned, partial exception. Assuming a given patent
grant is proper, it provides the patentee the power to bring an enforce-
ment action to exclude others from competing against it with a perfect
duplicate or close functional equivalent of the claimed invention.' 2 Com-
petition is the norm, and patent litigation to prevent it is not self-
executing: in any enforcement action, the patentee bears the burden of
proving liability, and an infringement allegation may be untenable.'
3
What follows from the competition norm?
First, antitrust law surrounds patent law. The standard economic
account of intellectual property protection is that it is a solution to a mar-
ket failure in the production of information goods.' 4 As Professor Mark
Lemley puts it, in the standard market failure account, "intellectual prop-
erty is a necessary evil."' 5 Our economy relies on interfirm competition
to provide consumers with the things they desire at lower quality-
adjusted prices. Firms are generally free to use public information to
compete with one another, even if the information is found through a
competitor's offering. "[I]n many instances there is no prohibition
against copying goods and products. In general, unless an intellectual
property right such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be
11. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221 (1980). As Justice Stevens
explained in a case nullifying a professional society's ethics canon against competitive bidding,
The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce
not only lower prices, but also better goods and services. "The heart of our national eco-
nomic policy long has been faith in the value of competition." The assumption that com-
petition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all
elements of a bargain-quality, service, safety, and durability-and not just the immedi-
ate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers.
Even assuming occasional exceptions to the presumed consequences of competition, the
statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad.
Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (quoting Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951)).
12. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1) (2000) (listing the rights a patent confers), 271(a) (defining direct
patent infringement).
13. For example, the patentee may mistake the scope of its claims, or perhaps the asserted
claims ought never to have been granted by the Patent Office in the first place. In this sense, patent
rights are profoundly probabilistic, conferring a right to sue rather than a right to exclude. See Her-
bert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 1719, 1761 (2003); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP.
75, 75 (2005); Joseph Scott Miller, This Bitter Has Some Sweet: Potential Antitrust Enforcement
Benefits from Patent Law's Procedural Rules, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 875, 881-82 (2003).
14. See generally Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for
Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 680-83 (2004) (reviewing standard account).
15. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129, 131 (2004). The standard account has its limitations and critics. See id. at 130-31.
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subject to copying."16 Moreover, the rights to exclude that patents and
copyrights confer "are part of a 'carefully crafted bargain,' under which,
once the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use
the invention or work at will and without attribution. ' 7 This commit-
ment to free competition reflects a faith "that imitation and refinement
through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very life-
blood of a competitive economy."' '
8
Second, the more fundamental status of free competition and anti-
trust highlights a further truth. A patent's protection from free competi-
tion is never more than partial; it is dry aboard the ship, but the ship still
bobs on an icy deep. The protection is limited in time: a utility patent
expires twenty years from the date on which the application for it was
first filed. 19 It is also limited by the realities of consumer preferences.
Throughout the life of the patent, the patented invention competes
against closer (or more distant) substitutes. For example, if I patent a
laundry detergent formula and market a product that embodies it, the de-
tergent will compete in a market filled with other detergents. Consumers'
preferences, expressed through their willingness to pay, will determine
which detergents, including my own, succeed. The relentless pressure of
16. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001). See also Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964) (stating that
[w]hen the patent expires the monopoly created by it expires, too, and the right to make
the article-including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when pat-
ented-passes to the public. Thus the patent system is one in which uniform federal stan-
dards are carefully used to promote invention while at the same time preserving free
competition.);
Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938) ("Sharing in the goodwill of an article
unprotected by patent or trademark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in the free exer-
cise of which the consuming public is deeply interested."); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163
U.S. 169, 185 (1896) (stating that
[i]t is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it ceases to
exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public
property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted. It follows, as a matter of
course, that on the termination of the patent there passes to the public the right to make
the machine in the form in which it was constructed during the patent.);
L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("[T]he public has
the right to copy the design of goods that are unprotected by patent or copyright, absent consumer
confusion or deception."). As Professor Janice Mueller puts it, "[i]n free market economies such as
that of the United States, the general rule is that competition through imitation of a competitor's
product or service is permitted, so long as that competition is not deemed legally 'unfair."' JANICE
M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 7-8 (2003).
17. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003) (quoting
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989)).
18. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146. See also id. at 150 ("[T]he purposes behind the Patent
Clause are best served by free competition and exploitation of either that which is already available
to the public or that which may be readily discemed from publicly available material.").
19. 35 U.S.C. § 15 4 (a)( 2 ) (2000).
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these more-or-less acceptable substitutes, not an abstract proposition
about patent protection, determines the market power of my detergent
patent. 20 More generally, "[t]he average patent.., confers too little mo-
nopoly power on the patentee in a meaningful economic sense to interest
a rational antitrust enforcer, and sometimes it confers no monopoly
power at all.",2
1
Third, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Illinois Tool Works
Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.22 embraces the basic fact that acceptable
substitutes discipline the market for a patented technology. In Illinois
Tool Works, the Court confronted the question of whether, in a challenge
to a tying arrangement, the antitrust plaintiff is entitled to a presumption
that the defendant has market power in the tying product if that tying
product is patented.23 The Court "conclude[d] that the mere fact that a
tying product is patented does not support such a presumption,, 24 over-
turning a decades-old approach from International Salt Co. v. United
States.25 One reason, the Court stated, for rejecting the presumption of
market power from a patent's presence is that, as "the vast majority of
academic literature recognizes," "a patent does not necessarily confer
market power., 26 The literature that the Court noted in Illinois Tool
Works, which distinguishes a formal legal rule from its practical eco-
nomic consequence, points the way to the second truth that the ship-sea
metaphor captures-namely, we grasp patent and antitrust with the
common science of economics.
20. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which hears all appeals arising under the
patent laws, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000), has been quite clear about this market definition point in
the context of modeling damages for infringement. See Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d
1119, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("The proper starting point to identify the relevant market is the pat-
ented invention. The relevant market also includes other devices or substitutes similar in physical
and functional characteristics to the patented invention. It excludes, however, alternatives with dis-
parately different prices or significantly different characteristics.") (internal quotation omitted). The
approach is familiar from antitrust's market definition inquiry. See, e.g., United States v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2003) ("A distinct product market comprises products that
are considered by consumers to be reasonably interchangeable with what the defendant sells.") (in-
ternal quotation and modifications omitted).
21. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 374-75 (2003). For a thorough discussion of the fact that "market
power [is] not inherent in [an] intellectual property grant," see I HERBERT A. HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP
AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW § 4.2 (2005).
22. 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).
23. Id, at 1284.
24. Id
25. 332 U.S. 392 (1947). See Illinois Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1288-91 (discussing Interna-
tional Salt's undermined foundations).
26. Illinois Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1292; see also id. at 1291 n.4 (citing sources).
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III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS DOMINATES
BOTH PATENT AND ANTITRUST POLICY
If we want a more systematic understanding of both the ship and
sea and how they interact, some physics and chemistry will help us make
significant progress over anecdote and folk wisdom. In much the same
way, we now routinely use economic analysis to identify and select pol-
icy options throughout both patent and antitrust law.27 Two examples
from recent developments in patent infringement damages jurisprudence
are sufficient to illustrate the point. Both examples involve the proper
analysis for showing one's entitlement to a lost profits award.
By way of background, the Patent Act entitles a prevailing patentee
to an award of "damages adequate to compensate for the infringement,
but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the in-
vention by the infringer., 28 "In practice, patentees seek lost profits as
damages when they are able to make the required showing. 29 What is
that showing? As a general matter, the key is proving "a sufficient causal
connection between the infringement and the unearned profit."3° To
prove that causal connection, one must reckon with complex market en-
try and price effect phenomena. Moreover, one must do so by creating a
picture of the "but for" world that would have existed if the infringement
in question had not occurred. 31 The Federal Circuit has demanded greater
fidelity to microeconomic principles in these "but for" reconstructions,
following a trail already blazed in antitrust.
First, in Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products Co.,
for example, the Federal Circuit confronted the question whether lost
profits damages are precluded where the infringer could have switched
quickly to a noninfringing substitute and competed effectively on that
27. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW ix (2d ed. 2001) ("Almost everyone pro-
fessionally involved in antitrust today ... not only agrees that the only goal of the antitrust laws
should be to promote economic welfare, but also agrees on the essential tenets of economic theory
that should be used to determine the consistency of specific business practices with that goal.");
Harvey S. Perlman, Taking the Protection-Access TradeoffSeriously, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1831, 1831
(2000) ("Law and economics scholarship has contributed much to our understanding of both the
nature of intellectual property rights generally and the features of individual intellectual property
regimes. Indeed it is hard to imagine a field other than antitrust law that is so explicitly governed by
economic thinking.").
28.35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
29. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW § 9.2, at 332 (2d
ed. 2004). See also Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
("If the record permits the determination of actual damages, namely, the profits the patentee lost
from the infringement, that determination accurately measures the patentee's loss.").
30. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 29, at 334.
31. See, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 352 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("To show
'but for' causation, the patentee must reconstruct the market to determine what profits the patentee
would have made had the market developed absent the infringing product.").
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basis (but never actually did so during the period for which damages are
sought). 32 The Federal Circuit, affirming the trial court,33 concluded that
the ready availability of a noninfringing substitute is potential competi-
tion that precludes a lost profits award.34 Stressing that "sound economic
proof of the nature of the market and likely outcomes with infringement
factored out of the economic picture" is what "prevent[s] the hypotheti-
cal from lapsing into pure speculation, 35 the court reasoned as follows:
The competitor in the "but for" marketplace is hardly likely to sur-
render its complete market share when faced with a patent, if it can
compete in some other lawful manner. Moreover, only by compar-
ing the patented invention to its next-best available alternative(s)-
regardless of whether the alternative(s) were actually produced and
sold during the infringement--can the court discern the market
value of the patent owner's exclusive right, and therefore his ex-
pected profit or reward, had the infringer's activities not prevented
him from taking full economic advantage of this right.36
The resemblance to conventional reasoning in antitrust market definition
analysis is plain,37 a byproduct of the reliance on microeconomics
common to both patent and antitrust law.
Second, in another move toward greater sophistication in economic
modeling, the Federal Circuit recently rejected a lost profits damages
theory because it did not take sufficient account of the demand effects of
price changes from infringing competition. 38 In older cases, the court had
used a rather simplistic model for determining lost profits damages--
namely, the product of the number of infringing units sold and the per-
unit-profit that the patentee earned before infringement (i.e., at the
32. 185 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
33. The trial judge in the case was Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation. See 893 F. Supp. 1386, 1388 (N.D. Ind. 1995). Judge Easter-
brook's contributions to the economic analysis of antitrust law, and to law and economics more
generally, are well known. His recent law review articles on antitrust include When Is It Worthwhile
to Use Courts to Search for Exclusionary Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 345; Information
and Antitrust, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1; and Does Antitrust Have a Comparative Advantage?, 23
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5 (1999).
34. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1349-51.
35. Id. at 1350.
36. Id. at 1351.
37. See, e.g., LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 159 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) ("When a mo-
nopolist's actions are designed to prevent one or more new or potential competitors from gaining a
foothold in the market by exclusionary, i.e., predatory, conduct, its success in that goal is not only
injurious to the potential competitor but also to competition in general."); POSNER, supra note 27, at
148-49 (noting the role of potential competition in market definition).
38. Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelectronics Int'l, 246 F.3d 1336, 1357-61
(Fed. Cir. 2001 ).
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uneroded price). 39 The problem with this approach, as longtime U.S.
Departmlent of Justice Antitrust Division economist Gregory J. Werden
40
explained in a 1999 journal article, is that it fails to take account of de-
mand effects: "a lower price [from a competing infringer] necessarily
implies a higher quantity [sold], other things being equal, so a necessary
consequence of price erosion is 'quantity accretion.' This link between
price and quantity is obvious to economists, but it has been recognized
by very few courts. ' 'A
Two years later, in Crystal Semiconductor, the Federal Circuit
faulted the patentee for omitting the very quantity accretion factor that
Werden proposed:
in a credible economic analysis, the patentee cannot show entitle-
ment to a higher price divorced from the effect of that higher price
on demand for the product. In other words, the patentee must also
present evidence of the (presumably reduced) amount of product the
patentee would have sold at the higher price.42
Just as it did in Grain Processing, the court in Crystal Semiconductor
insisted on detailed economic reasoning and evidence.
IV. ANTITRUST CANNOT SOLVE PROFOUND PATENT PROBLEMS
My final point is brief. The common susceptibility to economic
analysis that both antitrust and patent law share, as powerful as it is, does
not make either field's doctrines good tools for fixing deep problems in
39. See, e.g., TWM Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901-02 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See
also Sumanth Addanki, Economics and Patent Damages: A Practical Guide, in PLI's FOURTH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (1998), available at 532 PL1IPat 845, 851
(Westlaw) (describing this approach as the "nafve calculation of lost profits").
40. See www.abanet.org/antitrust/programs/at-spring-06/pdf/bios/werden-gregory.pdf for a
2006 biographical note about Werden.
41. Gregory J. Werden et al., Quantity Accretion: Mirror Image of Price Erosion from Patent
Infringement, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 479, 480 (1999); see also Addanki, supra note
39, at 852 (arguing that
[t]his is the flaw in the naive approach .. .: the expanded output associated with in-
fringement could not have been sold at the higher prices that prevailed pre-infringement.
If the patentee is presumed to sell all of the output produced by the infringer, profits can-
not logically be calculated assuming pre-infringement price and profit levels because the
aggregate quantity being absorbed by the market (patentee's plus infringer's sales) is
higher than before and would, therefore, only be absorbed at some lower price.).
42. 246 F.3d at 1357; see also id at 1359 (stating,
[T]he record does not contain sufficient evidence to show the reaction of the market if,
'but for' infringement, Crystal would have tried to charge at least 89¢ more per CODEC.
All markets must respect the law of demand. According to the law of demand, consumers
will almost always purchase fewer units of a product at a higher price than at a lower
price, possibly substituting other products. (citation omitted)).
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the other. If a ship is taking on water, you cannot save it by adding more
water.
If, for example, our implementation of patent law harms competi-
tion by routinely granting imprudent patents on obvious inventions (as
many now believe is the case43), we can do little about it by applying
antitrust law doctrines. Professor Thomas Cotter recently contrasted in-
ternal reform of intellectual property laws with external application of
antitrust enforcement tools. He noted, quite rightly, that antitrust "can be
slow, inflexible, and (what with treble damages, the possibility of indi-
rect purchaser suits under state law or [European Commission] law, and
the like) potentially susceptible to serious overdeterrence problems when
applied outside the context of conventional price-fixing schemes. '' 4 We
risk much if the overdeterrence Professor Cotter describes overly chills
the patenting of genuine, socially valuable inventions.
Our appreciation for competition's vital role in promoting innova-
tion, tutored by experience with antitrust law and policy, does, however,
expose the importance of calibrating the patent law rules to our competi-
tion needs. More than that, antitrust law's innovation-fostering spirit
should encourage the antitrust community to take an active role in patent
law reform. Indeed, FTC Commissioner William E. Kovacic recently
urged just this sort of antitrust input.45 Additionally, the FTC's exhaus-
tive October 2003 study on competition and patent law and policy 46 ex-
emplifies the great insights that an antitrust perspective can bring to
43. See, e.g., SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 29, at 161; John H. Barton, Non-
Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475 (2003); Rebecca Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions
from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004); Bronwyn H. Hall & Diet-
mar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System-Design Choices and Expected Impact,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989 (2004). Happily, the Supreme Court has granted review in a case for
the October 2006 Term that provides it the opportunity to reinforce patent law against the approval
of patents for obvious inventions. See Anandashankar Mazumdar, High Court to Review 'Teaching-
Suggestion-Motivation' Standard for Patent Obviousness, 72 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA)
233 (June 20, 2006) (discussing Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006)).
44. Thomas F. Cotter, Evaluating the Pro- and Anticompetitive Effects of Intellectual Property
Protection, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Mar. 2006, at 1, 6 (book review), available at http:/l
www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/06/03/MarO6-CotterRev3=22f.pdf.
45. William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property: Redefining the Role of
Competition Agencies, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 1, 2
(Franqois L6vque & Howard Shelanski eds. 2005). In January 2004, when he gave the talk embod-
ied in this book chapter, Commissioner Kovacic was the FTC's General Counsel. His biographical
sketch is on the FTC's website, at http://www.ftc.gov/bios/commissioners.htm#Kovacic.
46. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/
I 0/innovationrpt.pdf.
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patent law debates. 47 Healthy competition policy requires healthy intel-
lectual property law policy.
V. CONCLUSION
My nautical metaphor for patent law's relationship to antitrust law
helps me see things that the intersection metaphor does not. Perhaps it
will aid you too. If not, please cast it aside. It is the facts, not the words
about them, that require our deepest attention.
47. The report has already had an impact on policymakers' views of patent law, if Supreme
Court Justices' recent citations to the report are any indication. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lab. Corp. v. Metabolite Labs., 126
S. Ct. 2921, 2927 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari as having been improvi-
dently granted).
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